At the turn of the 2000s, the canton of Vaud set out to reform its cantonal bank, the Banque Cantonale Vaudoise (BCV). The bill put to the Grand Council opened the way to a partial privatisation: cutting the state's share of the capital and giving the bank more leeway.
The left — Social Democrats, Greens, consumer and tenant associations — rejected this loosening of public control and launched a referendum, in the name of keeping a bank serving the local economy and the regions.
On 23 September 2001, Vaud voters rejected the law with 55.4 % of the vote (41,206 No against 33,161 Yes). The state remained the majority shareholder. A year later the BCV collapsed — and the taxpayer, still the owner, would foot the bill.
▲ Yes to the law (44.6 %) Supporters — the centre-right and business circles — gathered 44.6 % of the vote (33,161 Yes). Not enough. | ▼ No to the law (55.4 %) — wins The left's referendum prevailed with 55.4 % No (41,206 votes). The state remained the BCV's majority shareholder. |
The players
▲ Yes camp (for the law) • The cantonal government and the majority of the Grand Council • The centre-right (Radicals/Liberals, SVP) and business circles • Backers of a more autonomous bank, less dependent on the state | ▼ No camp (referendum committee) • The Social Democratic Party and the Greens, who launched the referendum • Consumer and tenant associations • Defenders of a cantonal bank serving the local economy and the regions |
Arguments and verdicts
▲ Arguments FOR (Yes camp) Give the BCV the means to modernise « a bank too dependent on the state lacks agility » Verdict: ✗~ Disproved — but not as expected. The aftermath showed the problem was not public ownership but governance: poor risk management (bad loans, reckless expansion) drove the bank to near-bankruptcy in 2002. Source: RTS; Le Temps; inquiry commission report Reduce the taxpayer's exposure « the state should not bear banking risk alone » Verdict: ✓ Tragically confirmed. As majority shareholder, the canton had to join the rescue: a capital increase of about CHF 1.25 billion in 2003, hundreds of millions of it borne by the state. Source: Le Temps; BCV archives | ▼ Arguments AGAINST (No camp) Preserve a bank serving the local economy « keep a public BCV, close to the regions and SMEs » Verdict: ✓~ Goal met, at a steep price. The BCV did stay majority-public. But that choice saddled the taxpayer with the cost of the 2002-2003 rescue, far removed from the proximity mission championed. Source: swissinfo; Le Temps A « dangerous and perhaps unworkable » law « the bill weakens public control with no safeguards » Verdict: ✗~ Largely disproved. The danger came not from the rejected law but from the bank itself: CHF 1.2 billion in losses, the dismissal of chairman Gilbert Duchoud, a parliamentary inquiry commission and criminal proceedings against former executives. Source: RTS; Le Temps |
The record, in figures
✗ 55.4% No on 23.09.2001 (law rejected) | ! 2002 BCV collapse, ~CHF 1.2bn in losses | ! ~1.25bn recapitalisation (2003), partly borne by the state | ! Inquiry + trial parliamentary inquiry and prosecution of former executives |
The 2001 BCV vote was first and foremost an ideological left-right clash over the role of the state: should public control of the cantonal bank be loosened? The left, by referendum, said no.
It won: the BCV stayed mostly in the canton's hands. On paper, a clear victory for public-service banking and regional proximity.
The irony is cruel. A few months later the bank collapsed — not because of its status, but because of disastrous governance and risk management. As owner, the Vaud taxpayer had to fund a massive recapitalisation.
In the end, no one had seen the real catastrophe coming: the ownership debate masked the only question that mattered — who runs the bank. Both sides were right… about the wrong subject.