On 4 December 1994, in the middle of a decade of sharply rising asylum applications and against the backdrop of the Balkan wars, Swiss voters approved by 72.9% the federal act on coercive measures in immigration law. The vote sealed one of the clearest yeses of the decade on migration.
Passed by Parliament in March 1994 and defended by Federal Councillor Arnold Koller, head of the Federal Department of Justice and Police, the law aimed to make the enforcement of removals easier and authorised the administrative detention of foreigners without a residence permit, even absent any criminal offence.
Aid agencies and refugee-defence organisations, backed by the Social Democrats and the Labour Party, launched a referendum. They denounced a logic of suspicion and the risk of arbitrary detention; supporters countered that the point was to enable the state to enforce its own decisions.
The verdict was emphatic: all 26 cantons accepted the law, on a turnout of 44%. Administrative detention came into force on 1 February 1995 and would become a lasting pillar of Swiss immigration law.
▲ Cantons that accepted All 26 cantons voted yes: Zurich, Bern, Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Obwalden, Nidwalden, Glarus, Zug, Fribourg, Solothurn, Basel-Stadt, Basel-Landschaft, Schaffhausen, Appenzell Outer Rhodes, Appenzell Inner Rhodes, St. Gallen, Graubünden, Aargau, Thurgau, Ticino, Vaud, Valais, Neuchâtel, Geneva and Jura. | ▼ Cantons that rejected No canton rejected the law. |
Actors and personalities
▲ Yes camp • Federal Council (Arnold Koller, head of the FDJP) • Majority of Parliament (National Council 111-51, Council of States 37-2) • Christian Democrats, Radicals (FDP), SVP, Liberals, Evangelicals, Swiss Democrats, Lega, Freedom Party • Business associations (Vorort, Employers' Union, Trade Association) | ▼ No camp • Social Democrats and Labour Party, who launched the referendum • The Greens (GPS) • Aid agencies and asylum organisations (OSAR, Caritas, church circles) • Swiss Trade Union Federation and Travail.Suisse |
Arguments and verdicts
▲ Arguments FOR (Yes camp) Giving the state the means to enforce removals « The authorities must be given the means to enforce removal orders and end abuses. » — Federal Council, message in support of the law (1993) ✓~ Partly confirmed Administrative detention became a pillar of removal enforcement, carried over and extended in the Foreign Nationals Act (FNA, 2008) and then the FNIA. Its effectiveness remains partial, however: a large share of detentions do not result in an actual removal. Source: swissvotes.ch/vote/417.00 ; SEM, enforcement statistics An exceptional, brief and supervised detention « Detention will remain a measure of last resort, time-limited and subject to judicial review. » — Centre-right supporters, campaign booklet (1994) ✗~ Partly refuted The original maximum durations (three months of preparatory detention, nine months pending removal) were sharply extended over successive revisions, up to 18 months under the FNA after Switzerland adopted the EU Return Directive (2010). The practice became routine, though judicial review was maintained. Source: FNA/FNIA art. 75-79 ; humanrights.ch | ▼ Arguments AGAINST (No camp) The risk of arbitrary detention « People who have committed no offence will be locked up for months. » — Referendum committee (1994) ✓~ Partly confirmed Administrative detention does indeed affect people with no criminal offence, and its duration has been extended. Detention conditions have repeatedly been criticised by the National Commission for the Prevention of Torture and by NGOs. The judicial framework and the proportionality requirement nonetheless curbed the worst excesses. Source: NCPT, reports ; humanrights.ch A law that will not solve removal enforcement « Without the cooperation of countries of origin, these measures will remain largely ineffective. » — Aid agencies (1994) ✓ Argument confirmed The main obstacle to removals remained, for decades, the absence of travel documents and the lack of cooperation from states of origin — confirmed by later reports and the proliferation of readmission agreements. Internal coercion was not enough. Source: SEM, readmission agreements |
Affiches de campagne (16)
Factual record
1 Confirmed | 2 Partly confirmed | 1 Partly refuted | 0 Refuted |
| ~ | A tool made permanent, with partial effectiveness Administrative detention survived every revision and now sits in the FNIA, with a duration of up to 18 months. Heavily used, its yield in actual removals is regularly debated. Source: SEM ; FNIA art. 75-79 |
| ~ | Removals hostage to foreign cooperation As opponents had predicted, enforcement still founders on identifying people and securing their readmission. Switzerland had to multiply readmission agreements after 1995. Source: SEM |
| ✓ | Judicial oversight that held Every detention remains subject to review by a judge; the Federal Supreme Court and the NCPT regularly recalled the proportionality requirements, containing the gravest excesses forecast in 1994. Source: Federal Supreme Court case law ; NCPT |
The resounding yes of 1994 reflected the anxious climate of the time around asylum and crime. Thirty years on, the coercive-measures law has deeply and durably shaped Swiss immigration law: its central instrument, administrative detention, has never been challenged in principle.
The promises of effectiveness, however, were only half met. Switzerland detains a great deal, but the structural obstacle flagged as early as 1994 by opponents — the lack of cooperation from states of origin — has never been removed and continues to limit the number of actual removals.
As for fears of arbitrariness, they have partly materialised: detention durations have multiplied and conditions have drawn criticism. But judicial review, brandished in 1994 as a safeguard, broadly held and prevented the most extreme abuses.
In the end, a mixed record: a durable tool, uneven effectiveness, preserved safeguards. Few campaign arguments proved entirely right or entirely wrong.