In the late 2000s, a few minaret projects — notably in Wangen bei Olten — sparked highly publicised local opposition. In 2007, a committee formed by the SVP and the EDU, known as the “Egerkingen Committee”, launched a federal popular initiative seeking to enshrine in the Constitution that “the construction of minarets is prohibited”.
At the time of the vote, Switzerland had four minarets (Zurich, Geneva, Winterthur and Wangen bei Olten), none of which broadcast the call to prayer. The Muslim population then represented about 4.5% of inhabitants, mostly of Balkan and Turkish origin and largely not visibly observant.
The Federal Council, Parliament and every major party except the SVP and the EDU recommended rejection, as did the churches, the business community and human-rights organisations. All saw it as an infringement of religious freedom and a risk to the country's image.
On 29 November 2009, with turnout of 53.8%, the initiative was accepted by 57.5% of voters and by a large majority of cantons — only Geneva, Vaud, Neuchâtel and Basel-City rejected it. The result came as a surprise: the final poll showed 37% Yes, a gap of about 20 points between stated intention and actual vote, one of the largest ever observed in Switzerland.
▲ Cantons that accepted 22 cantons — almost all of German-speaking Switzerland, Ticino, plus Fribourg, Valais and Jura | ▼ Cantons that rejected Geneva · Vaud · Neuchâtel · Basel-City (4 cantons) |
Actors and figures
▲ Yes camp (initiators) • Egerkingen Committee • Walter Wobmann (SVP, Solothurn), co-initiator • Ulrich Schlüer (SVP, Zurich), co-initiator • Swiss People's Party (SVP) • Federal Democratic Union (EDU) | ▼ No camp • Federal Council (full college) • SP, FDP, The Centre (CVP), Greens, EVP • Reformed Church and Swiss Bishops' Conference • Business community (economiesuisse) • Amnesty International and human-rights organisations |
Arguments and verdicts — 15 years on
▲ Arguments FOR (Egerkingen Committee / SVP / EDU) Banning minarets will protect Switzerland from “Islamisation” and political Islam. “We must stop the creeping Islamisation of Switzerland.” — Egerkingen Committee, campaign argument 2009 ✗ Argument refuted This is the initiative's central promise, and it is testable: the ban applied only to buildings. Fifteen years on, with the ban in force, the Muslim presence has continued to grow (from about 4.5% to 5.4% of the population) and no “political Islam” has taken hold. The measure therefore changed nothing about the phenomenon it claimed to combat: the minaret was not its driver. Source: FSO, structural population survey 2009-2022 The minaret is the symbol of a political-religious bid for power that must be neutralised. “The minaret is the symbol of a will to political conquest.” — Ulrich Schlüer, SVP National Councillor, co-initiator ✗ Argument refuted The claim concerned the nature of the existing minarets — four in Switzerland in 2009. Neither before nor after the vote did these buildings serve as a lever of political or legal domination. The premise, testable on the real minarets, was never borne out. Source: observation of Muslim places of worship 2009-2024; academic literature The ban will defend women's rights against political Islam. “It is also a vote for women's equality.” — Egerkingen Committee, 2009 ✗ Argument refuted Testable promise: banning a structure had no documented effect on the situation of Muslim women in Switzerland. No study found any improvement linked to the measure. The promised benefit was not delivered. Source: VOX analyses 2009; academic literature on the vote | ▼ Arguments AGAINST (Federal Council / parties / churches) The ban violates religious freedom and will be struck down by the European Court of Human Rights. “This ban is contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights.” — Federal Council, position statement 2009 ✗~ Partly refuted The ECtHR declared the appeals inadmissible in 2011 (for lack of victim status): the ban was never struck down and still appears in the Constitution. The legal consequence brandished by opponents therefore did not occur — even though legal scholars continue to regard the provision as incompatible with Article 9 ECHR. Source: ECtHR, Ouardiri v. Switzerland and League of Muslims v. Switzerland, inadmissibility of 28.06.2011 The vote will isolate Switzerland and lastingly push it to the margins of the international community. “Switzerland will emerge weakened and isolated on the international stage.” — Diplomatic and business circles, 2009 ✗~ Partly refuted Condemnation was sharp and immediate (UN, Council of Europe, world press), but the predicted isolation did not occur: no boycott, no diplomatic or economic rupture, no lasting marginalisation. Switzerland was not sidelined. Only momentary criticism remained, with no material consequences. Source: international press review 2009-2010; bilateral relations It is an unprecedented discriminatory measure that stigmatises a religious minority. “We are writing a discrimination into the Constitution.” — Churches and human-rights organisations, 2009 ✓ Argument confirmed The result is a provision (Art. 72(3) Cst.) that explicitly targets the buildings of a single religion — a unique case in a Western European constitution. Its discriminatory and symbolically stigmatising character was confirmed: the norm has never had anything but symbolic reach. Source: Federal Constitution, Art. 72(3); constitutional doctrine This vote will open the door to further initiatives targeting Muslims. “After minarets, they'll go after the veil.” — Opponents of the initiative, 2009 ✓ Argument confirmed The dynamic was confirmed: the initiative banning face-covering (“anti-burka”) was accepted in 2021, and debates over the veil and clothing multiplied. The 2009 vote normalised the use of the popular initiative on Islam-related themes. Source: Federal Chancellery, votes 2009-2024 |
Factual assessment · 15 years on (2024)
2 Confirmed | 0 Partly confirmed | 2 Partly refuted | 3 Refuted |
Demographics and society: the predicted “Islamisation” did not happen | FSO, religious statistics |
| ~ | Despite the ban, the Muslim share of the population kept growing modestly, from about 4.5% (2009) to 5.4% (2022). No institution applies religious law in place of Swiss law: the measure changed nothing about the phenomenon it targeted. Source: FSO, structural survey 2009-2022 |
| ✓ | In 2009 Switzerland had four minarets and projects were very rare: the ban thus targeted an already very marginal reality. Source: survey of Muslim places of worship, 2009 |
Law and international image | ECtHR / Council of Europe |
| ! | The ECtHR declared the appeals inadmissible in 2011: the norm remains in force, but legal scholars deem it incompatible with religious freedom (Art. 9 ECHR). Source: ECtHR, inadmissibility of 28.06.2011 |
| ~ | International criticism (UN, Council of Europe, press) was sharp but had no follow-through: no boycott, no diplomatic rupture, no sidelining. Switzerland was not marginalised. Source: international press review 2009-2010; bilateral relations |
Political dynamics: a precedent that caught on | Federal Chancellery |
| ! | The “anti-burka” initiative was accepted in 2021 (51.2%), confirming the effectiveness of the popular-initiative vehicle on Islam-related themes. Source: Federal Chancellery, vote of 07.03.2021 |
| ~ | The 2009 vote is still cited as the turning point that normalised this type of identity-driven initiative in Swiss politics. Source: political-science studies (University of Bern, etc.) |
Fifteen years on, the initiators' promises do not hold up to the facts. The initiative was presented as a protection against “Islamisation” and political Islam; but the ban applied only to buildings. The Muslim presence kept growing modestly, no “political Islam” took hold, and women's situation saw no effect linked to the measure. On what it claimed to combat, the ban changed nothing.
On the opponents' side, some fears were also overstated. Switzerland was not pushed to the margins of the international community: criticism was sharp and immediate (UN, Council of Europe, world press), but with no lasting diplomatic or economic isolation. And their legal forecast — a strike-down by the European Court of Human Rights — did not materialise: the appeals were declared inadmissible in 2011, for lack of an applicant able to claim victim status.
Two of the opponents' warnings, however, were borne out. First, the discriminatory character of the norm: a provision unique in a Western European constitution, explicitly targeting the buildings of a single religion. Second, the knock-on effect, confirmed by the acceptance of the “anti-burka” initiative in 2021: the 2009 vote normalised the use of the popular initiative on Islam-related themes.
In the end, the minaret ban was above all a symbolic vote. It solved nothing of the “problem” it claimed to address, triggered neither international isolation nor legal sanction, but wrote into the Constitution a stigmatising norm that, in practice, applies to almost nothing. Its most lasting effect is not on minarets but on public debate: it shifted the boundary of what it has become possible to put to a popular vote.