On 3 March 2013, Swiss voters overwhelmingly approved the popular initiative "against excessive compensation", known as the Minder Initiative, after its author, Schaffhausen entrepreneur and Council of States member Thomas Minder. With 67.9 % Yes and unanimous approval from all 26 cantons, the text recorded the third-best score in modern Swiss voting history.
The canton of Jura led the field (77.1 % Yes), followed by Neuchâtel (71.9 %), Zurich (70.2 %) and Ticino (70.8 %). The most moderate support came from Obwalden (56.1 %). Turnout reached 46.5 %.
The initiative requires a binding shareholder vote on executive compensation at listed companies and bans severance payments, advance payments, and indemnities linked to corporate acquisitions or sales. This fact-sheet evaluates the campaign's promises against the Ordinance against Excessive Compensation (OaEC) that took effect on 1 January 2014, the 2020 revisions to the Code of Obligations, and the observed evolution of executive pay over thirteen years.
▲ Cantons that accepted All 26 cantons. The most enthusiastic results: JU (77.1 % Yes), NE (71.9 %), TI (70.8 %), BE (70.3 %), ZH (70.2 %), FR (70.3 %). The most moderate: OW (56.1 %), NW (58.7 %), AI (59 %), SZ (60.1 %). | ▼ Cantons that rejected No canton |
Actors and personalities
▲ Yes camp • Thomas Minder (initiator, independent Council of States member SH, sat with SVP group) • Social Democratic Party (SP) • Greens • Swiss Federation of Trade Unions (SGB/USS) • Travail.Suisse • Evangelical Party (EVP) • Small shareholders and ethical foundations (notably Ethos) | ▼ No camp • Federal Council (negative recommendation, preferred the indirect counter-proposal) • FDP (supported the counter-proposal) • CVP (today The Centre) (split positions) • SVP national (officially neutral, divided base) • economiesuisse (most visible and best-funded opponent) • Swiss Employers' Association (SAV) • Swiss Trade Association (SGV) |
Arguments and verdicts
▲ Arguments FOR (Yes camp) Shareholders must decide on executive pay « Today, boards of directors set their own compensation without real shareholder oversight. That opens the door to abuse. » — Thomas Minder, 2013 campaign ✓ Argument confirmé The OaEC (in force since 1 January 2014) and the revised stock corporation law (effective from 2023) now require a binding annual vote by the general assembly on compensation for the board, executive committee and advisory board. All listed Swiss companies apply this mechanism. The argument has been fully transposed into law. Source : OaEC (CC 221.331), CO art. 732-735c; CDBF Severance payments and welcome bonuses (golden parachutes) must be banned « Severance packages paid to executives dismissed for mismanagement are scandalous. They must be banned. » — Initiative committee, 2013 ✓~ Partiellement confirmé The ban is enshrined in the Constitution (art. 95 para. 3) and operationalised by the OaEC. But workarounds have been documented: salary continuation until the notice period ends (up to twelve months), payments linked to non-compete clauses, or compensation for bonuses forgone at a previous employer — Zurich Insurance paid 7.8 million to three new executive committee members on these grounds. The ban holds legally but is partly circumvented in practice. Source : Travail.Suisse 2015; Le Temps; CDBF Empowering shareholders will reduce excessive pay « Shareholders are the owners of companies. When they decide, excessive pay will no longer pass. » — Initiative committee, 2013 ✗~ Partiellement infirmé The verdict is nuanced. Actual rejections of compensation reports at general assemblies remain rare: the average approval rate at 2025 AGMs reached 86.9 % across the 155 SPI companies holding such a vote. Median SMI CEO compensation fell after 2014 but has rebounded: in 2024 the average SMI executive earned 8.3 million francs, comparable to 2013. SMIM executive pay rose 13 %, that of smaller listed companies rose 30 %. Source : Ethos studies on SMI compensation 2014-2025 | ▼ Arguments AGAINST (No camp) The initiative will hurt Switzerland's economic attractiveness « If the initiative passes, large companies will leave Switzerland for more flexible jurisdictions. This threatens tens of thousands of jobs. » — economiesuisse, 2013 campaign dossier ✗ Argument infirmé The argument is refuted. No SMI or SMIM company relocated its headquarters as a result of the initiative. Switzerland remained a preferred multinational hub (Glencore consolidation, Stadler listing, etc.). The number of companies listed on the SIX Swiss Exchange has been broadly stable. The predicted fears did not materialise. Source : SIX Swiss Exchange annual reports; KPMG Swiss Headquarters Report The initiative will not bring down CEO pay « This initiative is window dressing. Giving shareholders power will not change the amounts paid — on the contrary, compensation will be talked about more than before. » — Felix Hess, vice-president SAV, 2013 ✓ Argument confirmé This critical claim from the No camp has largely been borne out. After a transient drop between 2014 and 2020, SMI CEO compensation returned to its 2013 level, and that of mid- and small-cap firms rose sharply. Say on pay shifted practices (more transparency, more complex structures) without producing a lasting decline in amounts. The No camp's diagnosis of the mechanism's limited effect is confirmed by the figures. Source : Ethos studies 2014-2025; Bilan; Le Temps "+37 % since 2013" Parliament's indirect counter-proposal is enough « The Code of Obligations revision passed by Parliament already contains the essentials — a consultative vote and more transparency. Writing criminal sanctions into the Constitution is disproportionate. » — Federal Council, 2009 dispatch ✗~ Partiellement infirmé The counter-proposal provided only for a consultative vote and contained no severance ban or criminal sanctions. The 2014-2023 implementation showed that the binding vote and explicit ban produced concrete legal effects — particularly in contract structuring — that the counter-proposal would not have produced. The claim that the counter-proposal "was enough" is partly refuted: it would have allowed the main targeted practices to persist. Source : CDBF; OaEC vs. 2009 draft CO |
Factual record
2 Confirmed | 1 Partly confirmed | 2 Partly refuted | 1 Refuted |
| ✓ | Binding say on pay has entered Swiss law The 2014 OaEC, then the revised stock corporation law in force since 2023, fully transpose the binding annual shareholder vote. All listed Swiss companies are covered. The initiative's institutional promise has been kept. Source : OaEC (CC 221.331), CO art. 732-735c |
| ~ | The effect on amounts remains limited After a transient drop in 2014-2020, SMI CEO pay has returned to its 2013 level, while that of SMIM and smaller listed companies has clearly risen. The mechanism increased transparency and disciplined compensation reporting, but did not durably reduce amounts. Source : Ethos studies; Bilan; Le Temps |
| ! | The economic fears did not materialise No significant relocations or loss of attractiveness has been documented. The Swiss listed-company landscape stayed stable and the financial centre did not suffer from the initiative. The No camp's flagship argument is clearly refuted by the facts. Source : SIX Swiss Exchange; KPMG Swiss Headquarters Report |
| ~ | The ban on golden parachutes is being circumvented The formal ban on severance and welcome payments holds, but workarounds are practised: salary continuation during extended notice periods, payments for non-compete commitments, compensation for forgone bonuses. The initiative's spirit is partly preserved; only its letter strictly so. Source : Travail.Suisse 2015; CDBF; Le Temps |
Thirteen years after its landslide approval, the Minder Initiative offers a mixed record. Institutionally, the victory is clear: binding say on pay has entered Swiss law, the ban on severance payments is in the Constitution, and the 2020 Code of Obligations revision has locked the architecture in place.
On material effects, however, the assessment is more nuanced. Executive pay did fall after the OaEC took effect, but has since returned to pre-vote levels — and surpassed them at mid-cap companies. The discipline introduced shifted practices toward more transparency without triggering the structural decline in amounts that initiators had announced.
The economic fears stirred by the No camp — headquarter relocations, loss of attractiveness — did not materialise. The flagship argument of the anti-Minder campaign is contradicted by the facts, which stands as a lasting lesson from the vote: regulating executive pay proved compatible with Switzerland's competitiveness as a business location.